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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREG CHILD,
Petitioner/Appellee.

RENEE GLOBIS,
Respondent/Appellant.

Appeal No.:l20090486

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
UT.

R. APP. P. 3(a) and UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4l03(2)(h) provide this Court

with jurisdiction over this appeal resulting from the Order \Re: Petition To Modify Order
filed on April 27, 2009 (the 'Order"), entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court, in
and for Grand County, with the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in finding \that a substantial change of
circumstances had occurred after the August 2007 judgment, thus
resulting in the April 27, 2009 Orders

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Utah law makes | clear that a determination of
whether substantial and material changes have occurred is a fact-intensive legal
determination that is presumed valid and is reviewed fori abuse of discretion." Doyle v.
Dovle, 2009 UT App 306,1J15, 221 P.3d 888; see, Young| v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, ^|4,

201 P.3d 301, cert denied, 211 P.3d 986 (Utah 2009), Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App
47, IflO, 997 P.2d 903, and Moon v. Mooa 1999 UT App 12, 1J28, 973 P.2d 431, cert
denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999).
ISSUE II:

Did the trial court err in finding that it was in the best interest of
Ariann to modify the custody arrangement to sole legal custody
vested with Child?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court's factual findings underlying. . .a
determination of the children's best interests [in a modification based on material change
of circumstances] may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." Hudema v. Carpenter,
1999 UT App 290, f21, 989 P.2d 491, citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah App.
1995). "A court's legal conclusion as to whether a material change in circumstances has
occurred that would warrant reconsidering [a prior custody order] is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion." Id. "A trial judge's award of custody ... is also reviewed for abuse
of discretion." Id.
ISSUE III: Is the issue of attorneys' fees from the original custody order
adequately before this Court in this appeal from modification
proceedings when the trial court already addressed that issue during
that time and no appeal was taken from that order; and is Appellant
entitled to attorneys fees in this action since she is acting pro se, has
not sufficiently briefed the issue on appeal andfailed to preserve the
issue below?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n appellate court plays a iimited role' in reviewing a
district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs, and deference is given to a district
court's judgment on the matter, since the court is in a better position to assess the course
of litigation and quality." Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications,
Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1527 (10th Cir.1991). See Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee
2

Corp., 175 F.3d 762 (C.A.10 (Okla.) 1999). When a notice ok appeal concerning an issue
is untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of it. See, e.g., Serrato v.
Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,1f 7, 13 P.3d 616. "We have consistently declined
to review issues that are not adequately briefed." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n (In re
Questar Gas Co.), 2007 UT 79, ^ 40, 175 P.3d 545. When jin appellant fails to preserve
an issue below and does not argue that plain error or exceptional circumstances exist to
justify review of an issue, this Court has declined to consider it on appeal. State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995).

ISSUE IV: Does Appellant's failure to follow the proper briefing requirements
contained in UT. R. APP. P. 24 constitute either grounds for
dismissal of this appeal or assumption of the correctness and
affirmation of the judgment below?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "When considering arguments on appeal, we look
to the requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an appellant adequately briefed the
issue."

State v. Lucero 2002 UT App 135 ^|9 47 P.3d 107. "If a party fails to make a

concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are
supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below." Fackrell v.
Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d 612, 612-13 (Utah
1987). See also White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Pub. Serv Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1088, 1089
n. 1 (Utah 1985); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982); Koulis v. Standard
Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

U T . R . CIV. P. 7(f)(1)

B.

UT. R. CIV. P. 7(f)(2)

C.

UT. R. CIV. P. 52(a)

D.

UT. R. CIV. P. 106(b)(1)(B)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS1

Greg Child ("Child") and Renee Globis ("Globis") are the parents of Ariann
Lucinda Child ("Ariann") born August 9, 2004. Child and Globis were never married.
R0003 at p. 1. On January 20, 2005 Child filed a Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody
and Related Matters. R0003. On October 30, 2007 the juvenile court entered its Order
Re: Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody and Related Matters (the "Order"). R0134.
The Order gave Child and Globis joint legal custody of Ariann, with Globis maintaining
primary physical custody. Id. at pp. 1-2. Parent time was to be continued as the parties
had done in the past, with Child having extended parent time with Ariann if he was to be
out of town. Id. at p. 2. Globis was to have the final say in matters related to the joint
legal custody of Ariann, with Child being able to turn to the court for resolution. Id.
The court ordered that neither party was to make disparaging remarks about the
other, and parent time exchange was to be as peaceful as possible. Id. at p. 4. Child was
to maintain health insurance on Ariann with one-half of the premium to be deducted from
his monthly child support, and both parties were to pay one-half of out of pocket costs,
deductibles, co-pays, etc., with each party paying one-half of daycare costs and a
1

These sections of the brief have been combined based on the fact that the transcripts of the proceedings below were
not provided in accordance with UT. R. APP. P. 11 by Appellant herein, which transcripts would contain the more
precise "facts" of this matter. While counsel herein typically sets forth information taken from the pleadings in this
matter under the "Statement of the Case" section of a brief, doing so would leave no further information to be
included in a "Statement of the Facts" section absent a transcript. Hence, the two sections have been combined
herein.

4

preference given to Child to allow him to care for Ariann if hb was available. Id. at pp. 46. Globis was ordered to pay $5,100.00 to Child as repayment for the loan he had given
her, and Globis was awarded the tax deduction of Ariann with Child being able to claim
such deduction if he paid Globis the difference towards! her taxes for taking such
deduction. Id. at p. 6.
The Court concluded that, in the event of any relocation, UTAH CODE ANN. §30-337 would apply. Ariann was authorized to begin traveling jo Australia with Child at the
age of three and a half (3.5) years, and internationally at the age of five (5). Id. at p. 7.
On February 29, 2008 Child filed a Petition to Modify Custody ("Petition to
Modify") based on the fact Globis had decided to relocate jo Salt Lake City. R0156. In
the Petition to Modify, Child argued that a substantial ihange in circumstances had
occurred because Globis was moving to Salt Lake City, hadj not had an adequate job since
the entry of the Order, and could not afford rent. R0157. She had dissipated her assets,
leaving her with no means of supporting Ariann, had been evicted from her home, had no
financial means of obtaining adequate housing, and was unable to care for Ariann or
provide her with necessities and support.

Id.

Joint egal custody was no longer

appropriate due to the distance between the parties, and Child was requesting he be
awarded sole custody with reasonable visitation to Globus and child support computed
according to statute. R0157-158.
On April 1, 2008 a hearing was held to address thtfse issues. At such hearing the
court ordered (temporarily) "the visitation be modified to jhat of the statutory schedule of
parents who are separated a distance of more than 100 miles." Child was to pay for the

travel expenses. R0173. On July 10, 2008, during the bench trial on the Petition to
Modify, Child and Globis negotiated an agreement for visitation. R0238. The language
of the proposed Order was disputed and a formal Order was never signed by the trial
court.
On October 6, 2008, Child filed his Motion to Set Aside Agreement of 7/11/2008,
Request for Trial Setting and Request for Hearing on Temporary Orders ("Motion to Set
Aside"). R0252. In his Motion to Set Aside, Child argued that the information presented
to the trial court by Globis at the July 10, 2008, bench trial regarding employment, living
arrangements, and daycare was not entirely truthful, and requested such agreement
reached by the parties at such hearing be set aside. R0254.

Child

supported

such

Motion to Set Aside by affidavit, in which he indicated that, at the April 1, 2008, hearing,
Globis had given the court an inaccurate residential address. R0258. He indicated that,
at the July 10, 2008, hearing, after making agreements with Globis, she refused to come
to a conclusion as to the wording that should be used in the Order finalizing their
agreement, and would withhold parent time unless Child gave her money for living
expenses. R0259-260. It was finally learned through discussions between the parties and
Globis' counsel that much of the information she had given the court regarding her living
arrangement, employment, and daycare arrangements was incorrect and untrue. R0260.
On November 18, 2008, a hearing was held in which Child asked the court to
reconsider the July temporary7 order because such order was based upon false information
provided by Globis. R0292. Child was then ordered to pay child support in the amount
of $351 a month, and each parent was temporarily ordered to provide transportation of
6

Ariann one way for parent time. Id. at pp. 1-2. Child was flowed to continue making
deductions from child support for health insurance prenjiiums. Child was to have
visitation with Ariann every third week of the month, and th(e matter was set for trial on
February 20, 2009. Id. at p. 2.
On February 20, 2009, a trial was held on the merit^. R0322. Both parties and
numerous witnesses testified. The Court asked both parties to submit written arguments.
Id. at p. 2. Globis had once again misrepresented material f^cts and Child filed a motion
on March 13, 2009, to re-open the proceeding pursuant to ru^es 59 and 60(b). R0377.
On April 7, 2009, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision (the "Decision")
encompassing the ruling of the court on the merits and on (the motions. R0472. In the
Decision, the trial court discussed the history of this matter,) including the fact that Child
either had custody or cared for Ariann approximately forty percent (40%) of the time,
that Globis was a failure at managing money, had squandered her inheritance of almost
$150,000, owed several people money in relation to housing, was an unreliable witness,
and that the court was not optimistic that she would ever b^ able to focus and hold down
a job to provide a stable and secure home for Ariann. R047J2-474.
In the Decision, the trial court indicated that Chjild was able to manage his
finances even though his income was irregular. R0474. The trial court believed he could
provide a secure and stable home for Ariann, but believed Child's weakness was whether
he had the emotional flexibility for raising a five (5) year old child. R0474-475. Child
had also been much more critical of Globis than the tria court considered reasonable.
R0475.

In the Decision, the trial court indicated that both parents had been heavily
involved in Ariann's life and that her interests were best served by having ongoing
involvement with both parents. R0476-477, R0482. The trial court considered numerous
factors in determining custody and parent time including: past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards of each parent; which parent will act in the child's best interests; bonding
between parent and child; and maturity of parents. R0481. The trial court believed that
Child was better situated to provide for Ariann and accordingly awarded custody to
Child. R0182.
Globis filed a Notice of Appeal on May 27, 2009. R0571. On or about June 10,
2009, Globis contacted the court appointed transcriber by letter and requested a copy of
the transcripts from this matter. R0576. Globis also contacted the transcriber to discuss
making payments over a period of time. The Court transcriber denied the payment plan
proposed by Globis, and Globis did not obtain certified transcripts in this matter.
On December 4, 2009, Globis filed a Motion for Use of Uncertified Transcripts,
which Child opposed and which was denied by this Court. On January 19, 2010, Globis
submitted her Brief of Appellant to this Court. However, the Brief did not adhere to UT.
R. APR R 27. Thus, Globis filed an amended brief and a Motion for Acceptance of
Appellant's Amended Brief under UT. R. APR P. 22(b)(4)(A)(B)(C)(D)y (b)(5)(B)(C)(D)
("Motion for Acceptance") with this Court on February 8, 2010, and indicated that she
was filing an amended brief to comply with UT. R. APR P. 24 and 27.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first
8

show that a substantial material change of circumstances has| occurred since the entry of
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Nelscjn v. Nelson, 2004 UT App
254, 112, 97 P.3d 722, citing Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, f l l , 997 P.2d 903
(quotations, citations and emphasis omitted).

In Huderqa v. Carpenter, this Court

discussed the modification of child custody orders as follows \
Before modifying a custody order, the court conducts a bifurcated inquiry
to determine, first, if there has been a substantial and material change in the
circumstances upon which the award was based, and, if so, whether a
modification is in the best interests of the child. See UTAH CODE ANN. §303-10.4 (1998); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v.
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1995) The required finding
of changed circumstances promotes the policies of preserving stability in
the child's relationships and preventing the burden on the parties and courts
of successive adjudications. See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the
court generally may not consider evidence of the child's best interests until
it finds changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright] 941 P.2d 646, 650-51
(Utah Ct.App. 1997).
Ibid., 1999 UT App 290, 1J22, 989 P.2d 491. In Moodi v. Moody it states, "[T]he
nonfunctioning of a joint custody arrangement is deafly a substantial change in
circumstances which justifies reopening the custody issue." \fbid. 715 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah
1985).
In the instant matter, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred and the
trial court awarded sole custody of Ariann to Child. Glo|)is moved from Moab to Salt
Lake City, which caused the joint custody arrangement l[he parties had been using to
become nonfunctioning. Globis could not obtain stable employment or housing and was
bouncing around from house to house, thus, not providing a stable environment for
Ariann or providing for her best interests. Since the circumstances had changed, the trial

9

court was correct in awarding custody to Child.
Under Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Utah 1996)5 the Utah Supreme
Court set forth several factors to be considered with respect to a best interests
determination on a modification of a custody order. These factors included bonding
between the child and the parents, the ability of the parents to financially support the
child, the possibility of continuity of the prior custody order, and other matters.
However, this Court noted that, "[w]hen maintaining one parent's primary physical
custody will not truly preserve stability and continuity in the child's life, the court may
find less compelling circumstance are sufficient to modify the custody order." Hudema
v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ^|26, 989 P.2d 491. The trial court appropriately
determined that the presumption for continuity of placement was adequately rebutted by
Globis' lack of stability in employment and housing, together with her determination to
relocate her and Ariann to Salt Lake City without any adequate plan for an
ability to viably support the two of them. Child's bond with Ariann, continuing financial
support, and stability in employment and housing all supported a finding that her best
interests were more appropriately dealt with in a modification from joint custody to sole
custody with Child.
"In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith...." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,
^|45, 86 P.3d 712. In this matter, Globis has requested attorney's fees and costs for the
separate and distinct proceedings dealing with the initial paternity petition not properly
10

before this Court, in addition to attorneys fees surrounding this appeal from the new
modification proceedings. Not only did the trial court adequately address the issue in the
paternity action by ordering that the parties pay their own attorneys' fees and costs, but
she is significantly outside the time for requesting such fees from that separate action.
Additionally, she has not adequately briefed her request for these modification
proceedings, and failed to preserve the issue in the trial court below.
UT. R. APP P. 24(a) mandates that all briefs shall contain the following pertinent
parts:
(a)(4) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and (a)
(5) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court or a statement of grounds for seeking review of ^n issue not preserved
in the trial court.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain j the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in! the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of thb record relied on. A
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal a^l record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to Recover attorney's fees
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly ^nd set forth the legal
basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
In the instant matter, Globis has failed to meet the Requirements for briefs as set
forth in UT. R. APP P. 24(a). More specifically, (1) the issu^ section of her brief does not
have the appropriate standard of review or authority, (2} her issues are inadequately
briefed in the argument portion of her brief and are unsupported by any citation to
relevant authority, and (3) her conclusion is not short, precise, or concise but instead

11

appears to be what should likely have been included in the argument section of her brief
Thus, as Globis' brief is not in conformance with UT. R. APP P. 24(a) and her appeal
should either be dismissed or this Court should presume the correctness of the judgment
below and affirm the trial court's Decision at issue herein.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT A
SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE
OF
CIRCUMSTANCES
HAD
OCCURRED.

"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first
show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App
254, %2, 97 P.3d 722, citing Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, 111, 997 P.2d 903
(quotations, citations and emphasis omitted). In its analysis of change of custody and
child support, this Court has determined the following:
[T]he court must determine first whether there is sufficient evidence of a
substantial change in circumstances to justify relitigation of the custody
question and, then, the trial court must consider the changes in
circumstances along with all other evidence relevant to the welfare or best
interests of the child and modify, or refuse to modify, the decree
accordingly [.]
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). "[T]he party seeking modification must
demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous decree, there have been changes in the
circumstances upon which the previous award was based; and (2) that those changes are
sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody." Id.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-10.4 addresses the modification of court orders with regards to
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child custody as follows:
The court may, after a hearing, modify an order that established custody if
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both oflthe custodians have
materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be
modified; and (b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order
would be an improvement for and in the best interest of the child. . .
(emphasis added.)
In Hudema v. Carpenter, this Court discussed the modification of child custody
orders as follows:
Before modifying a custody order, the court conductsl a bifurcated inquiry
to determine, first, if there has been a substantial and nfiaterial change in the
circumstances upon which the award was based, ailid, if so, whether a
modification is in the best interests of the child. See UTAH CODE ANN. §303-10.4 (1998); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v.
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1995). |The required finding
of changed circumstances promotes the policies of preserving stability in
the child's relationships and preventing the burden on me parties and courts
of successive adjudications. See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the
court generally may not consider evidence of the child's best interests until
it finds changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright, j)41 P.2d 646, 650-51
(Utah Ct.App. 1997).
Ibid, 1999 UT App 290, «f22, 989 P.2d 491. In Moody v. Moody it states, "[T]he
nonfunctioning of a joint custody arrangement is clearly a substantial change in
circumstances which justifies reopening the custody issue." Ibid. 715 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah
1985).
In Doyle v. Doyle, this Court indicated that this issue is "a fact-intensive
determination that is presumed valid and is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Ibid., 2009
UT App 306,1J15, 221 P.3d 888. This Court further noted as follows:
Also, in making such a determination, trial courts must be mindful of two
guiding principles: (1) the inquiry must 'ordinarily
focus exclusively on
the parenting ability of the custodial parent and the functioning of the
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established custodial relationship," Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626
(Utah 1987); and (2) the changed circumstances allegedly justifying the
modification must be material, that is, they must 'be the kind of
circumstances on which [the] earlier custody decision was based," Becker
[v. Becker], 694 P.2d [608,] 610 [(Utah 1984)].
Id.
In the current case, the original custody arrangement was based in large part on the
fact that both parents resided in Moab. "The parties [were] living approximately 20 to 30
miles apart and the geographical proximity of the homes [was] adequate for joint
custody." R0126. Since that hearing, however, Globis moved with Ariann to Salt Lake
City, creating approximately 250 miles in one-way distance between them and Child. As
the trial court stated, "[t]hough this primarily affects the relationship between Ariann and
Father, this change does reflect that Mother has substantially less regard for that
relationship than the court originally expected." R0479. This distance made it impossible
to enforce and maintain the custody and visitation arrangements that were in place and
caused them to become nonfunctioning. Moody at 509.
Globis' stability pertaining to employment and housing significantly changed
since the original custody arrangement. Globis' employment and housing in 2007 was
stable and heavily considered at that time when she was awarded primary physical
custody in the joint legal custody arrangement. However, since the original custody
arrangement, Globis "has moved Ariann from home to home in the Salt Lake area,
without having a realistic plan to pay for the selected housing."

R0479.

"She

consistently selects housing far above what her income would support, even when she is
employed." R0474.

Since the original custody order was entered, Globis "has not
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managed to hold a job for more than two months at a time." R0474. Since moving from
Moab, Globis has moved from job to job, ". . . without establishing herself as a desirable
employee for any of her employers. The court believe[d] it ip unlikely that [Globis] will
be able to find a viable niche for herself in the Salt Lake Citjf area which will match her
talents to a prospective employer's needs and provide for tne life style she apparently
considers necessary." R0479. "From watching her testify, tne court recognizes that she
is scattered and unfocused. The court is not optimistic th^t she will ever be able to
muster the focus necessary to hold down a job and provide a stable, secure home for
Ariann." R0474. She has been unable to maintain a job and provide stable living
arrangements for her and Ariann.

"[T]he court is persuaded that the circumstances

affecting [Globis'] role as primary physical custodian of Ariann are so different from
what the court believed to be true at the time of the original tijial, that a change in custody
must be considered." R0480.
The trial court also considered the following factors in deciding to modify custody
and what was in the best interest of Ariann:
1. Past Conduct and Demonstrated Moral Standards df Each Parent. "There is no
appreciable difference in the moral standards of Mother and Father. However,
Father has been more financially responsible than Mother and somewhat less
vindictive in dealing with those who oppose him.' R0481.
2. Which Parent Will Act in the Child's Best Interests. "[T]he court believes
Father is more likely to provide for the food, shelter, clothing, and education of
Ariann in a responsible way. He is also somewhat more likely to promote
frequent and continuing contact with the other parept." Id.
3. Bonding Between Parent and Child. "Though littl^ evidence was presented on
the bond between Ariann and each parent, the c<burt believes that she has a
strong bond with Mother, simply because she has recently spent substantially
more time with Mother. However, the relationship between Ariann and Father
is healthy and good." Id.
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4. Maturity of Parents. "Father is more emotionally mature than Mother.
However, both parents show signs of immaturity." Id.
Having taken these factors into consideration, the trial court noted as follows:
In view of all of those factors, the court believes Father is best able to
provide the necessities of life for Ariann and help her grow into a healthy
adult. The court accordingly awards custody to Father. However, the court
emphasizes that Ariann especially needs the influence of both parents in her
life because of the severe and complimentary strengths and weakness of
Mother and Father. It is therefore essential that Mother have liberal parent
time with Ariann.
R0482. Because a parenting plan was not submitted by either parent, and the relationship
between the parties has been filled with conflict, joint legal custody was not approved.
Id. The parties were encouraged to negotiate a liberal parent-time schedule, and if they
fail to agree, then the statutory schedule was to be imposed. Id. The court was correct in
granting sole physical and legal custody to the father based on the facts and considering
the numerous other factors.
Although, no parenting plan was presented as Globis raises in her brief, {see Brief
of Appellant at p. 19) it does not appear one is required. UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.8,
states as follows:
(1) In any proceeding under this chapter, including actions for paternity,
any party requesting joint custody, joint legal or physical custody, or any
other type of shared parenting arrangement, shall file and serve a proposed
parenting plan at the time of the filing of their original petition or at the
time of filing their answer or counterclaim. (2) In proceedings for a
modification of custody provisions or modification of a parenting plan, a
proposed parenting plan shall be filed and served with the petition to
modify, or the answer or counterclaim to the petition to modify.
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This statute, however, only governs a modification of custody arrangements contained in
a parenting plan2, not a modification from joint to sole legeal custody as was at issue
herein, which is separately governed by the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.4.
Hence, a parenting plan was not requisite under the petition filed by Child herein for a
modification of the custody order from joint legal custody to s0le legal custody.
Globis also raises the issue of an unfiled and incomplete petition for paternity that
Child's prior attorney was in the process of completing wheh the attorney unexpectedly
passed away.

Hand written additions had been added to such petition and Globis'

attorney at the time of trial attempted to show that Child hqd made the additions. See
Appellant's Brief at p. 34. It appears that by this allegation, Globis is attempting to attack
Child's credibility. In Pitt v. Taron this Court stated that, "[a] s the trier of fact in a bench
trial, the trial court 'is in the best position to' weigh conflicting evidence and the
credibility of witnesses. Ibid., 2009 UT App 113, ^|2, 210 P.3d 962, citing Homer v.
Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah Ct.App.1993). In D'Aston y. Aston, this Court further
states as follows:
Credibility determinations are within the sound discretion of the trial court.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche, 784 P[2d 465, 467 (Utah
App. 1989). "Because the trial court alone can asses^ the demeanor and
relative credibility of the witnesses [and] is charged jvith the fact finding
function ... we accord its actions broad deference." Jpckman v. Jackman,
696 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah 1985).

2
3

UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.8 is titled "Parenting Plan—Filing—Modifications."
In fact, UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10.4(4) specifically states tljat a parenting plan is

only
required when altering custody from a sole legal custody arrangement to a joint legal
custody arrangement.
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Ibid, 844 P.2d 345, 355, (Utah App.,1992.)

It is inappropriate for Globis to be

challenging the trial court's determination of Child's credibility below. The trial court is
the best position to decide his credibility and deference is given to them. Taron at TJ2, and
Aston at 355. Globis never challenged the petition for paternity, and Child was awarded
custody, so it appears this issue is moot and does not require review by this Court.
Globis also argues in her Brief of Appellant that "[t]he potential move from Moab
by Renee was contemplated early in these parties' relationship and, thus, was
acknowledged in the findings and the Order." Brief of Appellant pp. 34-35. Globis
makes this argument in an attempt to show that no substantial change in circumstances
occurred. However, she is mistaken in this argument. With regards to any potential
move, the findings and Order states, "fijn the event that either party relocates, U.C.A.
§30-3-37 shall apply." (Emphasis added). UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-37 as amended by the
Utah Legislature in 2010 reads as follows:
(l)For purposes of this section, "relocation" means moving from the state
or 150 miles or more from the residence specified in the couifs decree.
(2) The relocating parent shall provide, if possible, 60 days advance written
notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice
of relocation shall contain statements affirming the following:
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved
by both parties will be followed; and
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant
to court ordered parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved
by both parties.
(3) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own
motion, schedule a hearing with notice to review the notice of relocation
and parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and make
appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time
transportation.
(4) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the
transportation costs, the court shall consider:
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(a) the reason for the parent's relocation;
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents }n exercising parenttime;
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant.
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, upon the relocation, as defined in
Subsection (1), of one of the parties the following schedule shall be the
minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child:
(7) The custodial parent is entitled to all parent-t^me not specifically
allocated to the noncustodial parent.
(6) (8) In the event finances and distance preclude the Exercise of minimum
parent-time for the noncustodial parent during the school year, the court
should consider awarding more time for the noncustodial parent during the
summer time if it is in the best interests of the children.
(7) (9) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order uninterrupted
parent-time with the noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during
extended parent-time, unless the court finds it is not ill the best interests of
the child. If the court orders uninterrupted parent-time during a period not
covered by this section, it shall specify in its order which parent is
responsible for the child's travel expenses.
(&) (10) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the relocating party shall be
responsible for all the child's travel expenses relating jo Subsections (5)(a)
and (b) and 1/2 of the child's travel expenses relating to Subsection (5)(c),
provided the noncustodial parent is current on all support obligations. If the
noncustodial parent has been found in contempt for not being current on all
support obligations, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for all of
the child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless the court rules
otherwise. Reimbursement by either responsible party to the other for the
child's travel expenses shall be made within 30 days of receipt of
documents detailing those expenses.
(9) (11) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of
divorce.
I
(W) (12) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing.
(44) (13) A parent who fails to comply with the notice of relocation in
Subsection (2) shall be in contempt of the court's order
Although UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-37 does apply, the court fallowed that guideline in its
determination that a change of circumstances had occurred. This statute gives the court
guidelines in determining parent-time as well as giving it authority to "make appropriate
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orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation" as well as
allowing the court to consider factors necessary and relevant (including the economic
resources of both parents) when determining parent-time. As the court was considering
all the factors to determine parent-time, several issues were brought to light and it
became apparent that a change of circumstances had occurred, which resulted in the need
to award sole custody to Child. The change of circumstances was not based solely on
Globis' relocation to Salt Lake. It was also based on her inability to hold a job, unstable
housing arrangements, immaturity, etc.

Thus, even if the original custody order

addressed contemplated moves by the parties, such statement was made in general terms
rather than addressing a specific contemplated move at the time. Additionally, the court
still would have found that there had been a change of circumstances on the other factors.
Therefore, Globis argument is thus flawed.
Thus, based upon Globis' unstable employment and housing and her relocation to
Salt Lake City, which considerably changed the joint custody arrangement of the parties,
a substantial change in circumstances did occur and the trial court's award of custody to
Child was warranted. While Globis argues throughout her brief that she is no less of a
parent to Ariann because she has moved to Salt Lake City, Globis' relocation, together
with her failure to obtain stable employment and housing has led to a substantial change
of circumstances in this matter. Brief of Appellant beginning at p. 22. First, Globis'
move to Salt Lake City significantly affected the joint custody arrangement the parties
had been exercising, rendering it nonfunctional and thus causing a substantial change in
material circumstances. Moody at 509.
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Furthermore the fact that Globis had not held a job and had bounced around from
house to house since her relocation shows that leaving the chi d in her care was not in the
best interests of the child since Globis was failing to provide a stable environment in
which to reside with Ariann. The trial court found that, based upon the circumstances, it
was clearly in Ariann's best interests to be placed in the soli custody of Child since he
maintained the housing and employment necessary to provide her with a stable
environment. Globis further provided instability for Ariann having gone from job to job
since her move, which was clearly not in the best interests of Ariann. Thus, the trial court
decided that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred based upon Globis'
move and instability and thus awarded sole custody to Child. A substantial change in
circumstances had occurred and therefore, the trial court's decision was correct.
II.

CHANGE OF CUSTODY FROM JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY TO
SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY WAS IN THE CHILD'S BEST
INTERESTS.

Several factors are considered in a determination as to whether a custody change is
in the best interest of a particular child. Under Tucker v. Tucker, the Utah Supreme
Court indicated the following factors pertaining to the child's feelings and needs:
...the preference of the child; keeping siblings together;! the relative strength
of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; and, in
appropriate cases, the general interest in continuing previously determined
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted.
Ibid., 910 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Utah l996)(quoting Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41
(Utah 1982). Tucker further sets forth factors to be examined respecting the parents'
character and capacity, as follows:
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• . .moral character and emotional stability; duration and depth of desire for
custody; ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care; significant
impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive
drinking, or other cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in the
past; religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and financial condition.
Id., citing Hutchison at 41. It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court's
holdings in Tucker mimic those outlined in UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R4-903(5) as it
pertains to uniformity in custody evaluations.
This Court more recently addressed how factors pertaining to a change in custody
based on a material change in circumstances should be weighed, as follows:
Although the court considers many factors, each is not on equal footing.
Generally, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine, based on the
facts before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance and to
accord each factor its appropriate weight.
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, TJ26, 989 P.2d 491; see, Davis v. Davis, 749
P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah App 1998), cert
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). This Court pointed out that the myriad of factors in
such a determination range from "possibly relevant to the critically important," noting
that continuity of placement is considered critically important "when a child is thriving,
happy, and well-adjusted." Id.
However, not all continuity is alike. A heavy emphasis on preserving
stability presupposes that the prior arrangement is not only satisfactory, but
will in fact continue. As the trial court recognized in this case, there are
variations in the degree of continuity that can be afforded. When
maintaining one parent's primary physical custody will not truly
preserve stability and continuity in the child's life, the court may find
less compelling circumstance are sufficient to modify the custody
order. In this case, Hudema diminished the extent of possible continuity,
22

and thus the weight properly to be accorded this factojr, when she changed
the interpersonal dynamics of her household by remarrying and by moving
from Jackson's lifelong Layton home to a new home in another state. See
Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 723 n. 4 (Utah d.App.l994)("To an
extent, of course, uprooting children from their present schools and
neighborhood and moving them to a different state is inimical to continuity
in their lives.").
Id. at f27 (emphasis added). This Court concluded in Hudema that modification was
based on sufficient change of circumstances and that, ". . .continuing Hudema's custody
would do less to preserve overall stability in Jackson's life thaii is usual." Id. at ^}44.
In the Decision in the instant matter, the trial court ffound that Child either had
custody or cared for Ariann approximately forty percent (4Q%) of the time. It further
found that Globis was a failure at managing money, had sqikandered her inheritance of
almost $150,000, owed several people money in relation to housing, was an unreliable
witness, and that the court was not optimistic that she woula ever be able to focus and
hold down a job to provide a stable and secure home for Ariann. R0472-474. The trial
court indicated that Child was able to manage his finances e|en though his income was
irregular, and the trial court believed Child could provide a ^ecure and stable home for
Ariann. R0474-475.
The trial court found that both parents had been heavily involved in Ariann's life
and that her interests were best served by having ongoing involvement with both parents.
R0476-477, R0482. The trial court indicated that it considered numerous factors in
determining custody and parent time including: past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each parent; which parent will act in the child's best interests; bonding
between parent and child; and maturity of parents. R0481. ^he trial court believed that
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Child was better situated to provide for Ariann and accordingly awarded custody to
Child. R0182.
Clearly the trial court in this matter took into consideration the factors set forth in
Tucker, supra, weighing each factor appropriately in accordance with the spectrum set
forth in Hudema, supra, from "possibly relevant to the critically important."

While

continuity of placement with Globis would have typically been weighed as "critically
important," such presumption was rebutted by the fact that Globis evidenced an inability
to maintain stability for either herself or Ariann based on her sporadic employment
history and inability to provide financially for her or Ariann's needs. When combined
with the fact that Globis uprooted Ariann from the area in which her father lived—
someone Ariann spent forty percent (40%) of her day-to-day life with—it is clear that the
determination of best interests in this matter was correctly rendered by the trial court's
grant of custody to Child. See, Hudema, supra.
In Hudema, supra, this Court opined that the presumption that continuity of
placement was in the child's best interest was rebutted by the relocation of the parent
away from other kinship and family members, noting later in its decision that Hudema
somewhat minimized the negative impact on the child by only relocating from one
location to another rather than several. In the instant matter, Globis has relocated several
times and owes several individuals money in relation to housing.

Further, Globis'

financial circumstances are exacerbated by the fact that she is unable to maintain
employment, the court itself indicating that it was not optimistic that she would ever be
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able to focus and hold down a job to provide a stable and secure home for Ariann.
R0472-474.
"When maintaining one parent's primary physical custtody will not truly preserve
stability and continuity in the child's life, the court rbay find less compelling
circumstance are sufficient to modify the custody order." Huilema at T|27. Globis argues
that Ariann was happy in her placement with Globis and that| no evidence supported the
need for a change of custody; however, this ignores h^r own responsibilities in
maintaining the stability and continuity by obtaining employment and stable housing for
herself and Ariann. The circumstances in which Globis uprooted Ariann to Salt Lake
City from Moab, away from the secondary caretaker who mjaintained custody and care
for approximately forty percent (40%) of the time weighed in I favor of change of custody
to "truly preserve stability and continuity in the child's life."
Further, the trial court determined that Globis was an l unreliable witness. In the
Brief of Appellant, Globis argues that the trial court reopened the issue of her
untruthfulness regarding Ariann be dismissed from the Montessori preschool due to
Globis' failure to pay her one half of the tuition. Brief of Appellant at p. 45. Letters from
the preschool were submitted to the trial court indicating thai] Ariann was dismissed for
lack of payment. However, Globis previously testified that Ariann could still attend even
though she had not paid in full. Although Child did request that the court reconsider
testimony on this issue that was given at the hearing in February of 2009, the trial court
Although Child objects to the use of any non-certified transcripts in the briefing in this matter, as argued further
below, Globis' own inappropriate references cited to in her brief evidence her reliance on Child for money to
maintain stability for Ariann, with Child having paid over $5000 ahead in child support and another $2000 for
Globis to obtain a safe car to transport their daughter.
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denied Child's request to reopen it. See Findings of Fact at p. 7.
Both parents have been heavily involved in Ariann's life and the trial court
determined that it was in her best interests to grant sole custody to the parent who
evidenced a sincere desire for custody and who clearly desired to take on the
responsibilities of ensuring that Ariann's physical and emotional needs were all met. The
trial court believed Child could provide the secure and stable home for Ariann that had
been absent with Globis's exercise of custody. R0474-475. This Court should affirm the
trial court's determination that it was in Ariann's best interests to have sole legal custody
granted to Child.
III. GLOBIS IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
"It is the general rule that pro se litigants should not recover attorney fees for
successful litigation." See, e.g., Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 354 F.Supp. 310, 311
(N.D.Cal.1973); O'Neil v. Schuckardt 112 Idaho 472, 480, 733 P.2d 693, 706 (1986). Cf
Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Juneau v. Bernhardt, 794 P.2d 579, 581-82 (Alaska
1990); O'Neil v. Lumber Co. v. Nickelodeon Cos., 190 Mont. 25, 28, 617 P.2d 1291,
1293(1980).

Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 473, (Utah,!992). Furthermore, "[i]n

civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith...." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, | 4 5 , 86
P.3d 712. "A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." UT. R. APP. P.
24(a)(9).

"We have consistently declined to review issues that are not adequately
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briefed." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Common (In re Questar Gas Cf), 2007 UT 79, ^ 40, 175
P.3d 545.
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, TJ14, 48 P.3d 968. To determine
whether the trial court had such an opportunity, we consider three factors: "(1) the issue
must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal aut hority." Id. State v. Maese
2010 UT App 106, ^fl3. When an appellant fails to preserve ^n issue below and does not
argue that plain error or exceptional circumstances exist to jus ify review of an issue, this
Court has declined to consider it on appeal. State v. Pledger 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5
(Utah 1995).
"[A]n appellate court plays a 'limited role' in reviewing a district court's award of
attorneys' fees and costs, and deference is given to a district court's judgment on the
matter, since the court is in a better position to assess the course of litigation and quality."
Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, Inc^ 948 F.2d 1518, 1527
(10th Cir.1991). See Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 175 F.3d 762
(C.A.10 (Okla.) 1999). When a notice of appeal concerning! an issue is untimely, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of it. See, e.g., Serrato v. Utah Transit
Auth., 2000 UT App 299, If 7, 13 P.3d 616.
In the instant matter, Globis is seeking "an award of all of Appellant's fees and
costs incurred in defending Appellant from Appellees' [sic] initial Verified Petition for
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Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters that has now escalated to Appellant's appeal."
Globis is not entitled to fees and costs for several reasons. First, the time allowed for
Globis to seek attorney fees for the initial paternity petition is past. Even if the time
allowed was not past, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Order from
the initial paternity petition proceedings all specifically states that each party will pay his
or her own attorney's fees and court costs, only allowing for any further costs and
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the judgment should one party violate it.5
R0009, R0132, R0139-140. Thus, Globis is not entitled to attorneys fees because Child
did not fail to perform his obligation, but only sought on meritorious grounds to modify
the original grant of joint custody.
The paternity petition action is also not at issue in this appeal as Globis claims,
and thus she is not entitled to attorney's fees for that action. The modification is a
separate and distinct action from the initial paternity petition. The modification is not
connected with the paternity petition action. Globis appealed only from the modification
proceeding, not the initial paternity proceeding. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
address the issue. See, Serrato, supra.
Globis is likewise not entitled to attorney's fees as a result of the modification
since no attorney's fees were requested or awarded during the proceedings below and
thus such issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Maese at TJ13. Accordingly, this
Court should decline to reach the merits of such argument. Pledger, supra. Globis was

5

Child paid one of Globis' counsel $2,000 in fees and then was to be repaid by Globis. Child has never been repaid
by Globis an such issue was never further discussed by the trial court.
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also not the prevailing party in the modification proceeding! and thus, is not entitled to
attorney's fees. Sonnenreich at ^45. Globis is also representjing herself on appeal and is
not entitled to any attorney's fees on appeal. Batchelor at 473,.
Finally, Globis is in violation of UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)j(9) as she has not properly
briefed her request for attorney's fees and costs. Globis has not explicitly set forth the
legal basis for such award and thus has not properly briefed such claim. Since Globis did
not preserve the issue of attorney's fees and is now representing herself, the modification
was a separate action from the paternity action, and the modification is the action which
has led to this appeal, Globis is not entitled to any of the requested attorney's fees and
this Court should decline to address the issue.
IV.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PROPER BRIEFING
REQUIREMENTS, THUS THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
A. Globis' Brief Does Not Conform With UT. j . APR P. 24(a)

UT. R. APP P. 24(a) mandates that all briefs shall contain the following pertinent
parts:
(a)(4) A statement of the issues presented for review,] including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and (a)
(5) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an | issue not preserved
in the trial court.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain tl^e contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and| set forth the legal
basis for such an award.
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(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
In State v. Lucero, this Court determined the following with regards to the failure to brief
as set forth in UT. R. APP P. 24:
Defendant's appellate brief failed to comply with the rules of appellate
procedure, and thus the Court of Appeals was not required to address
defendant's appellate arguments, where defendant failed to cite where in
the record issues were preserved for review, he failed to set forth the proper
standard of review, and his argument section failed to include any relevant
citations, authority, or legal analysis that would support his allegations.
Ibid, 2002 UT App 135 TflO 47 P.3d 107. This Court farther stated, "[w]hen considering
arguments on appeal, we look to the requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an
appellant adequately briefed the issue." Id. at ^|9. Rule 24 requires "[a] statement of the
issues presented for review, including for each issue; [t]he standard of appellate review
with supporting authority; and a citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court." Id. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199-200 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996)(citing cases where this court has declined to reach merits of claims because
appellants' briefs failed to comply with Rule 24.) "This court noted that the requirements
of the rule [24] serve to "focus the briefs, thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in
the processing of appeals." Christensen v. Munns 812 P. 2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(specifically referring to standard of review requirement).
In the instant matter, Globis filed an Amended Brief on February 8, 2010, and
indicated that such Brief was in compliance with UT. R. APP. P. 24(a). However, the
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Brief does not conform to Rule 24. First, Globis is not in compliance with UT. R. APR P.
24 (a)(5). While she has set forth the issues she wishes to nave reviewed, she has not
cited the appropriate appellate review or supporting authority In fact, it does not appear
that she even briefed the issues set forth in the argument sectipn. Globis appears to have
intended to argue the issues of (1) whether a substantial change of circumstances has
occurred, (2) whether the trial court erred by not applying statutory procedure when it
terminated the joint custody arrangement, (3) whether the trial court violated her due
process rights by not equitably using the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of
Evidence between the parties, (4) whether the trial court erred in finding she should bear
the cost of transportation for parent time, and (5) whether she was entitled to attorney's
fees on appeal. However, not only does she cite no standard of review or supporting
authority for these issues, she fails to present them or adequately present them under the
argument section of her brief.

Her failure to present the standard of review and

supportive authority for the issues in her brief is a violation of JUT. R. APP P.24 (a)(5) and
thus should not be reviewed by this Court.
Next, Globis is in violation of UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(9) afe she has failed to present
and argument that has supportive authority or that relates to the issues presented. While
she sets forth a section entitled case law at the beginning of her brief, no case law is
present in the argument section of her brief to show how her argument is supported. Brief
of Appellant at p. xxviii. In fact, the majority of Globis' argument is colloquies from the
trial regarding her housing and financial issues that have not been transcribed, although
she "swears" such colloquies are true and correct this Court is wlithout transcripts to know
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if such colloquies are accurate depictions of what occurred at the trial in this matter.
Furthermore, she either does not address the issues set forth in her brief or fails to
adequately address them. She has also cited no supportive authority for her argument as
set forth in her brief. This is a direct violation of UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(9) and therefore,
this Court should decline to hear such arguments.
Finally, Globis has violated UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(10) in that her conclusion is not
short and concise and does not cite the precise relief sought. Instead it is five and a half
(5 l/i) pages of how the trial court erred and why it is in the best interest of the child to
remain with her. This section would have more appropriately fit in the argument section
of the brief and as it is not a precise, short, and concise version of the relief sought, this
court should not review it.
This court has noted that the requirements of the rule [24] serve to "focus the
briefs thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the processing of appeals."
Christensen at 69. Globis' brief fails to conform with the UT. R. APP P. 24(a)(4), (5), (9),
and (10) and thus such brief should be stricken in its entirety and not reviewed by this
Court.
B.

Globis Has Failed to Provide Certified Transcripts or Marshal
the Evidence, Both Requisite to a Challenge to Any Findings by
the District Court

UT. R. APR P 24(a)(9) in pertinent part states, "[a] party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."
"Appellants cannot discharge their duty to marshal all evidence supporting challenged
factual finding by simply providing an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at
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trial." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Nltountain Fonds 2006 UT
35, 140 P.3d 1200. "In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly
erroneous, "[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." Cnen v. Stewart, 2004 UT
82 f 19, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah, 2004.), citinz In re Estate of Bkrtell, 776 P.2d 885, 886
(Utah 1989) (internal quotations omitted). In Horton v. Gemj State Mut. of Utah, this
Court stated as follows:
Because Gem State has failed to provide us with la transcript of the
proceedings, we are unable to review the evidence and^ thus, are unable to
ascertain whether the trial court's findings were based upon sufficient
evidence. Absent the trial transcript, appellant's claim ojf error is ^merely an
unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resdlve." Mark VII Fin.
Consultants Co.,[v. Smedley] 792 P.2d [130,] 134 [(UT. Ct. App. 1990)].
Without all the relevant evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal, as
required by Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2), "we can only presume that the
judgment was supported by sufficient evidence." State\ v. Nine Thousand
One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 217 ( Utah Ct.App. 1990).
However, even aside from not including the transcript in the record, Gem
State still failed to meet its obligation to marshal] the evidence by
persistently arguing its own position without regard for the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, and failing to demonstrate that the
findings were against the clear weight of the evidence and, thus, clearly
erroneous.
Ibid., 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1990). In Mark VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v.
Smedley, this Court discussed Appellant's burden to provide thjis Court with an adequate
record on appeal as follows:
[Insurer's failure to provide Court of Appeals ^ith transcript of
proceedings rendered Court unable to review evidence and thus unable to
ascertain whether trial court's findings were based upon sufficient
evidence, and insurer failed to meets its obligation to jnarshal evidence.
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Appellant has burden of providing Court of Appeals with adequate record
to preserve its arguments for review, and must also marshal all evidence
that supports findings and demonstrates that, despite such evidence,
findings are so lacking in support as to be against clear weight of evidence
and thus clearly erroneous. RULE APP. PROC. RULE 11(e)(2). The Appellant
has the burden of providing us with an adequate record to preserve its
arguments for review.
Ibid., 792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
UT. R. APP. P. 11(e)(2) states, "[t]ranscript required of all evidence regarding
challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither
the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the
relevant portions of the transcript." In In re Estate of Bartell, it was noted by the Utah
Supreme Court that marshaling is required on challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence because, it is "reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on
disputed facts." Ibid., 116 P.2d. 885, 886 (Utah 1989).
In the instant matter, Globis failed to provide the Court with transcripts from the
trial court hearings, having been denied a payment arrangement by the transcriber and
denied submission by this Court of an uncertified copy she personally prepared.

In

Horton this Court determined that, without transcripts, this Court is unable to review the
evidence and "ascertain whether the trial court's findings were based upon sufficient
evidence." No transcripts have been made part of the record on appeal in this matter, and
in her brief Globis has relied solely on colloquy from the trial court hearings dealing with
her financial issues and lack of money, her lack of employment, her credibility as a
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witness, and her relationship with Ariann, attempting to use! such colloquy to show that
no substantial change in circumstances exists to warrant a change in custody. However,
Globis' failure to provide transcripts further emphasizes that jhis Court has no choice but
to presume the regularity of the proceedings below. Globis iswears" that the colloquies
upon which she relies in her brief are "word for word." Brief of Appellant at p. 21.
However, as this Court has not reviewed the hearings and has no transcripts before it to
review, it is impossible to know if the colloquies are word for word as Globis claims.
Globis has not and clearly cannot meet the marshaling] requirement respecting all
the necessary evidence in this matter. While she has the pleadings located in the record
upon which she could rely, these pleadings constitute only a minute amount of the
evidence that was presented, excluding all testimony from the hearings upon which the
trial court relied in rendering its decision. Globis is "unable to marshal all evidence
supporting challenged factual finding by simply providing an exhaustive review of all
evidence presented at trial." Without such evidence, this Court cannot determine whether
the trial court made an erroneous decision in its finding tha^: a substantial change in
circumstances existed.
Globis failed to marshal the evidence, failed to present the transcripts relating to
such evidence, failed to provide standard of review for her issues, failed to provide any
legal authority or citations for her argument, and failed to enter a short, concise, precise
conclusion. UT. R. APP. P. 24(a). Having been provided substantial opportunity by this
Court to correct these issues, Globis' Brief should thus be strickejn.
CONCLUSION
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WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this
Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the trial court in this matter.
DATED this

day of

, 2010.

Craig C. Halls
Attorney for Appellee
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
Attorney for Petitioner
333 South State Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3330

RLED

APR Z 7 2039

CUERK OF THE COURT
BYm

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE O^ UTAH

ORDER RE: PETITION TO
MODIFY ORDER

GREG CHILD,
Petitioner,

vs.
Civiltoo.0547-3
Judge jLyle R. Anderson

RENEE GLOBIS,
Respondent.

Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision entered in this matter
on April 7f 2009, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact entered
herewith,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The joint legal custody of the partids and primary

physical custody of the Respondent as to the minor child, Ariann,
.4(3).
is hereby terminated pursuant to U.C.A,§30-3-10,
2.

Sole legal and physical custody of theminor child,

Ariann, is hereby awarded to Petitioner, Greg piild pursuant to
U.C-A. §30-3-10.

ORDER RE: PETITION TO MODIFY ORDER

054700003
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3.
Ariann.

Respondent is entitled to liberal parent time with
If the parties are unable to negotiate a liberal parent

time schedule, the relocation statute found at §30-3-37 shall be
imposed if Respondent lives more than 150 miles from the child's
domicile in Moab, Utah; the statutory schedule found at S30-3-35
shall apply if the parties live closer than 150 miles apart.
This order may be supplemented with an order that deals with the
visitation at such time as the parties can ag^ee and submit a
stipulated schedule to the court.
4.

Respondent is obligated to pay child support at such

time as she establishes gainful employment in accordance with the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines,

The Court reserves the issue

of child support until Respondent has steady employment.
5.

The parties are ordered to provide medical, dental and

optical insurance for the minor child if available through
employment at a reasonable cost and each shall pay one-half of
all out-of-pocket expenses, including co-pays, deductibles and
premiums.

The party incurring the expense shall notify the other

within 30 days of an obligation being incurred.

Petitioner

currently carries such insurance and is entitled to a
contribution for one-half of such costs by Respondent.

000551

6.

Respondent shall be responsible for payment of one-half

of any work-related day care costs incurred by Petitioner.
Notice of such obligation shall be sent within 30 days of
incurring the expense.
7.

Costs of visitation with the child sihall be born by

Respondent•
8.

Respondent is ordered to execute anyl document and co-

operate in any way requested in the obtaining of a passport or
any other travel document to allow Ariann to gravel out of the
United States*
9*

The remaining provisions of the August, 2007, order

shall remain in full force and effect.
DATED t h i s l^ffL

day o f A p r i l ,

2009.

BY THE COUR^:

3

